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12 September 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

THROUGH :

SUBJECT : Requirements

1. As a follow on to my 12 September memo to you, I wish to add the appended comments by Lt. Gen. Lew Allen and [REDACTED] SIGINT Committee Chairman.

2. I am advised that Lew Allen, after reading [REDACTED] comments, said he associated himself completely with John's suggested solution vice his (Lew's) suggestion of using the NIOs.

/s/

[REDACTED]  
AC/CPAD/IC

Attachments: (2)

CPAD/IC, [REDACTED] (12 Sept 74)

Distribution:

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25X1 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
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Executive Registry

44-7207

Serial: N0399  
27 August 1974

The Honorable William E. Colby  
Director of Central Intelligence  
CIA Headquarters  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

I have been given the opportunity to review a draft of your proposed letter of instruction to the Chairman, SIGINT Committee. I heartily endorse the idea of giving the committee chairmen clear instructions regarding the role you expect them to play and the problems you wish them to specifically address. However, I am concerned that the thrust of the letter as regards "requirements" has a major shortcoming.

The SIGINT Committee is essentially an assemblage of SIGINT experts from the elements of the community. There are many functions they can perform for USIB but they are not the proper mechanism to identify SIGINT requirements based on substantive needs. The missing element of the process is a mechanism which views all sources of intelligence which can contribute to a substantive need and identifies the unique and necessary needs for SIGINT. Consultation with the NIOs is not strong enough, for it implies that the responsibility for the judgment is still in the functional area. That responsibility must be clearly assigned to some "all source" mechanism. The NIOs could be such a mechanism but perhaps there are other schemes you wish to consider.

I am so concerned about this point because I believe that most other aspects of the process are working pretty well and can be made to work better. But this fundamental flaw has been with us for a long time and will not be solved within the historic process.

Sincerely,

LEW ALLEN, JR.  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

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SIGINT COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

10 September 1974

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Maj Gen [REDACTED] USAF (Ret.)  
Intelligence Community Staff  
CIA Headquarters  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jack:

I have considered the matter raised by Gen. Allen in his letter of 27 August to Mr. Colby regarding the handling of requirements as described in the proposed Letter of Instruction for the Chairman of the SIGINT Committee. It seems logical that an orderly transition from community intelligence requirements to SIGINT guidance should include an intermediate step in which someone or some body determines that a particular intelligence discipline is the most likely source of the information to fill a particular intelligence need. The body who would perform such a function should be equipped with knowledge and experience in the capabilities and limitations of each of the intelligence disciplines. I happen to think that an experienced SIGINT person or body is best equipped to determine the likelihood and relative cost of acquiring particular information from SIGINT sources. I would have to guess that the same is true in the Imagery and HUMINT areas. If the validity of that point is accepted it seems to me that the DCI would be well served by a "clearing house" comprising at least one each experienced SIGINT, HUMINT and Imagery professional to decide among themselves which discipline should be considered the prime source for any given requirement or part thereof and in which the other disciplines might play a secondary role, if at all. My perception of the NIO body is somewhat different than Gen. Allen's and I do not believe that they are equipped to determine the most effective sources of information. Each may be able to make some judgments in some cases but I do not believe as presently constituted they are the most qualified body to decide which collection sources should be engaged to meet particular intelligence needs. To come to grips with the problem raised by Gen. Allen and expressed on previous occasions by others, it might be well to get on with a trial

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mechanism to get a real feel for what will be involved in making source decisions. It has been suggested in the past that the mechanism might comprise the Chairmen of COMIREX, Human Sources and the SIGINT Committee with someone like George Carver in charge. This is about as good a place to start as any. We might also include the Secretaries of the three committees. I am inclined to favor this approach because it places in the loop key representatives of the three USIB bodies that will ultimately be involved in the issuance of guidance to the various collectors.

Sincerely, //

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Copies Furnished:

Lt Gen Lew Allen, Jr., USAF

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12 September 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THROUGH

SUBJECT

: Intelligence Requirements

1. The purpose of this memo is to give you some considerations and possible talking points on the broad subject of "requirements" which may be useful in your 19 September meeting with the USIB Committee chairmen.

2. In my view, the problem of overall intelligence requirements has never been effectively addressed or structured as a system to which the necessary actions controlling the totality of intelligence endeavor can be related. As we now move into a period of severely constrained dollar and manpower resources for intelligence, the need for strict discipline in the requirements process becomes essential. No longer can the intelligence community do everything for everybody who has a demand or desire for responsive intelligence support.

3. The USIB, as a corporate intelligence community body, is responsible, under NSCID No. 1, for identifying and assigning priorities to all intelligence requirements. While this can be viewed as a national requirements responsibility, there is a multitude of departmental and "tactical" requirements which compete to a very large extent for responsiveness by the same intelligence resources which are tasked with national requirements. We cannot afford the luxury of dedicated resources for all different levels of requirements. Alternatively, the majority of intelligence resources are capable of responding to various levels or sources of requirements. The National/Tactical Interface Study is an effort specifically directed to this end.

4. As General Graham observed, "we are still making resource decisions without an audit trail back to the fundamental requirements

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to be served." This observation applies equally in the national, departmental and "tactical" arenas. And the constrained resources simply will not stretch to cover effectively all these requirements. It appears, therefore, that USIB must take a more active role in identifying, stating and prioritizing all intelligence requirements. As a further step, USIB should then determine the essentiality of action against these requirements by the various resources and collection disciplines available.

5. The current USIB committee structure is reasonably well geared to accomplish this latter task, but has no identifiable arrangement for dealing with the overall requirements problem. Thus, the major collection committees -- SIGINT, HUMINT, and PHOTINT (COMIREX) -- struggle continually to apply the full range of resources and activities with which they are concerned. This is a relatively simple task in the photo area (maintenance of target lists against which photosensors can operate), somewhat more complicated in the HUMINT area, and extremely complex in the SIGINT area where the widest range of requirements are tasked on highly technical systems operating in a technically sophisticated and secure environment.

6. Most, if not all, requirements are stated initially without regard for satisfaction capability, feasibility, complexity or cost. There is little or no effective mechanism for priority ordering all requirements or even those tasked within one collection discipline. There is no formal mechanism for determining which collection discipline can operate most effectively against a given requirement or where there may be trade offs among the different discipline capabilities. Director, NSA, has made the point, for example, that reductions in SIGINT resources have now reached a point where there must be a determination of the essentiality of the SIGINT source against a given requirement, rather than simply recognizing the existence of a SIGINT capability to respond as the basis for tasking.

7. In summary, the elements of the requirements problem confronting USIB include:

-- No focal point in our community structure to "staff" requirements for the USIB.

-- No effective prioritizing of all requirements regardless of source or application.

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-- No overall requirement evaluation or validation system which would enable us to reject less important or less meaningful requirements.

-- No procedure whereby the essentiality of one "INT" source or another can be clearly associated with a given requirement.

-- There is a "process" for requirements generation and application, but it is not designed as a total system.

8. Several remedies to these problems have evolved from recent rather superficial considerations:

-- Establish a new USIB committee on requirements.

-- Create an ad hoc committee made up of the Chairman of the SIGINT, HUMINT, and COMIREX Committees, possibly under the chairmanship of the D/DCI/NIO.

-- Constitute the NIOs as a requirements committee.

-- Constitute all collection and substantive USIB committee chairmen as a larger ad hoc committee on requirements.

9. None of these propositions has been studied in detail, nor in fact has the overall requirements problem been addressed. There is a compelling need to do so. The IC Staff, with cooperation of certain USIB committee chairmen and perhaps D/DCI/NIO, should take the lead in this effort.

10. Appended hereto are some of the papers which have been developed during recent months as various IC Staff officers considered and commented on the requirements problem.

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Attachments: (4)

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Memo for [ ] dtd 12 Sept 74  
Subject: Intelligence Requirements

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CPAD/IC/[ ]:jh (12 Sept 74)  
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